Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect

Hanna Fromell; Daniele Nosenzo; Trudy Owens; Fabio Tufano

doi:10.3917/reco.706.0927

Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect

Hanna Fromell, Daniele Nosenzo, Trudy Owens, Fabio Tufano

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Previous studies have shown that individuals are less likely to help a person in need when there are “bystanders” present who can also offer help. We designed an experiment to re-examine this “bystander effect” using modified dictator games. We find lower giving rates in the presence of bystanders, confirming the existence of a bystander effect. However, we also show that the recipient’s welfare is greater when bystanders are present, challenging the usual interpretation that the bystander effect is due to an erosion of prosocial values.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	927-943
Journal	Revue Economique
Volume	70
Issue number	2019/6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.706.0927
Publication status	Published - 30 Dec 2019

Keywords

Bystander effect
Bystander dilemma
diffusion of responsability
dictator game
social norms

Access to Document

10.3917/reco.706.0927

Cite this

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