Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

From weber to kafka: Political instability and the overproduction of laws

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

Abstract

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2964-3003
Number of pages40
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume111
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2021
Externally publishedYes

Cite this