Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?

Jonathan De Quidt; Francesco Fallucchi; Felix Kölle; Daniele Nosenzo; Simone Quercia

doi:10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9

Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?

Jonathan De Quidt, Francesco Fallucchi, Felix Kölle, Daniele Nosenzo, Simone Quercia

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	174-182
Nombre de pages	0
journal	Journal of the Economic Science Association
Volume	3
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9
état	Publié - 1 janv. 2017

Accès au document

10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9License: autre

Autres fichiers et liens

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9

2 Working paper

The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games
Casal, S., Fallucchi, F. & Quercia, S., sept. 2018, LISER, 48 p. (Working Papers; Numéro 2018-15).
Résultats de recherche: Papier de travail › Working paper

Accès ouvert
File
Inequality and Competitive Effort: The Roles of Asymmetric Resources, Opportunity and Outcomes
Fallucchi, F. & Ramalingam, A., 2017, LISER, 60 p. (Working Papers; Numéro 2017-12).
Résultats de recherche: Papier de travail › Working paper

Accès ouvert
File

Contient cette citation

@article{8c65b1dd76374aab92f95cbfb38b23c4,

title = "Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?",

abstract = "We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.",

keywords = "Llss aversion, bonus, contract framing, fine, penalty",

author = "{De Quidt}, Jonathan and Francesco Fallucchi and Felix K{\"o}lle and Daniele Nosenzo and Simone Quercia",

year = "2017",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9",

language = "English",

volume = "3",

pages = "174--182",

journal = "Journal of the Economic Science Association",