Résumé
Evidence shows that the willingness of individuals to avenge punishment inflicted upon them for transgressions they committed constitutes a significant obstacle toward upholding social norms and cooperation. The drivers of this behavior, however, are not well understood. We hypothesize that ulterior motive attribution-the tendency to assign ulterior motives to punishers for their actions-increases the likelihood of counter-punishment. We exogenously manipulate the ability to attribute ulterior motives to punishers by having the punisher be either an unaffected third party or a second party who, as the victim of a transgression, may be driven to punish by a desire to take revenge. We show that survey respondents consider second-party punishment to be substantially more likely to be driven by ulterior motives than an identical, payoff-equalizing punishment meted out by a third party. In line with our hypothesis, we find that second-party punishment is 66.3% more likely to trigger counter-punishment than third-party punishment in a lab experiment. The loss in earnings due to counter-punishment is 64.6% higher for second-party punishers than third-party punishers, all else equal.
| langue originale | Anglais |
|---|---|
| Pages (de - à) | 193-206 |
| Nombre de pages | 14 |
| journal | Journal of the Economic Science Association |
| Volume | 9 |
| Numéro de publication | 2 |
| Les DOIs | |
| état | Publié - déc. 2023 |
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