Résumé
With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.
| langue originale | Anglais |
|---|---|
| Pages (de - à) | 2964-3003 |
| Nombre de pages | 40 |
| journal | American Economic Review |
| Volume | 111 |
| Numéro de publication | 9 |
| Les DOIs | |
| état | Publié - sept. 2021 |
| Modification externe | Oui |
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