Passer à la navigation principale Passer à la recherche Passer au contenu principal

From weber to kafka: Political instability and the overproduction of laws

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journalReview articleRevue par des pairs

Résumé

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.

langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)2964-3003
Nombre de pages40
journalAmerican Economic Review
Volume111
Numéro de publication9
Les DOIs
étatPublié - sept. 2021
Modification externeOui

Une note bibliographique

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.

Contient cette citation