Preferences for Truth-Telling

Johannes Abeler, Daniele Nosenzo, Collin Raymond

    Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journalArticleRevue par des pairs

    Résumé

    Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth‐telling.
    langue originaleAnglais
    Pages (de - à)1115-1153
    journalEconometrica
    Volume87
    Numéro de publication4
    Les DOIs
    étatPublié - 1 juil. 2019

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