TY - JOUR
T1 - Shifting normative beliefs
T2 - On why groups behave more antisocially than individuals
AU - Behnk, Sascha
AU - Hao, Li
AU - Reuben, Ernesto
N1 - Funding Information:
Reuben gratefully recognizes financial support by Tamkeen under the NYU Abu Dhabi Research Institute Award CG005 . Behnk gratefully acknowledges the helpful support from Aurora García Gallego and Iván Barreda Tarrazona from the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at University Jaume I.
PY - 2022/6
Y1 - 2022/6
N2 - A growing body of research shows that people tend to act more antisocially in groups than alone. However, little is known about why having “partners in crime” has such an effect. We run an experiment using sender–receiver games in which we elicit subjects’ normative and empirical beliefs to shed light on potential driving factors of this phenomenon. We find that the involvement of an additional sender makes the antisocial actions of senders more normatively acceptable to all parties, including receivers. By contrast, empirical beliefs are unaffected by the additional sender, suggesting that antisocial behavior increases in groups because antisocial actions become more acceptable and not because acceptable behavior is expected less often. We identify a necessary condition for this effect: the additional sender has to actively participate in the decision-making.
AB - A growing body of research shows that people tend to act more antisocially in groups than alone. However, little is known about why having “partners in crime” has such an effect. We run an experiment using sender–receiver games in which we elicit subjects’ normative and empirical beliefs to shed light on potential driving factors of this phenomenon. We find that the involvement of an additional sender makes the antisocial actions of senders more normatively acceptable to all parties, including receivers. By contrast, empirical beliefs are unaffected by the additional sender, suggesting that antisocial behavior increases in groups because antisocial actions become more acceptable and not because acceptable behavior is expected less often. We identify a necessary condition for this effect: the additional sender has to actively participate in the decision-making.
KW - Antisocial behavior
KW - Empirical beliefs
KW - Group decision-making
KW - Guilt aversion
KW - Normative beliefs
KW - Social norms
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85129562835&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/c216986b-89cb-373d-a7a0-70da6dd97cfe/
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104116
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104116
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85129562835
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 145
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
M1 - 104116
ER -