Do market incentives for hospitals affect health and service utilization? evidence from prospective pay system–diagnosis-related groups tariffs in Italian regions

Lorenzo Cappellari, Anna De Paoli, Gilberto Turati

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journalArticleRevue par des pairs

Résumé

We exploit variation across Italian regions in the implementation of region‐specific tariffs within a prospective pay system for hospitals based on diagnosis‐related groups to assess their effect on health and on the use of healthcare services. We consider survey data for the years 1993–2007 with information on both individuals’ perceived health and their utilization of healthcare services. The results suggest that the introduction of market incentives via a fixed price payment system did not lead to worse health perceptions. Instead, it marked a moderate decrease in hospitalization coupled with a clearer decrease in the utilization of emergency services. We also find mild evidence of reduced satisfaction with healthcare services among hospital patients. These effects were stronger for adoptions occurring when also the national government supported the market‐based approach. Results are robust to sensitivity checks.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)885-905
journalJournal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A: Statistics in Society
Volume179
Numéro de publication4
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 2016
Modification externeOui

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