On the optimality of public pensions in an economy with life-cyclers and myopes

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Résumé

In this paper, we develop a two-period overlapping generations model with two types of individuals, life-cyclers and myopes. We revisit Feldstein's problem by deriving the optimal level of social security using a social welfare function à la Samuelson (rather than à la Lerner). In opposition to the Lerner solution, our optimal pension benefit exhibits several interesting properties (dynamic efficiency, egalitarism, easy implementation). Then the opportunity to move to a partially funded system is examined. It turns out that a partially funded system ensures the equality of utility within and across generations. The effective use of funding opportunities is less a question of rate of return than a question of equal treatment of individuals.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)121-140
Nombre de pages20
journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume47
Numéro de publication1
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 2002
Modification externeOui

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