Résumé
This paper considers a three-overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth wherein human capital is the engine of growth. It first contrasts the laissez-faire and the optimal solutions. Three possible accumulation regimes are distinguished. Then it discusses a standard set of tax-transfer instruments that allow for decentralization of the social optimum. Within the limits of our model, the rationale for the standard pattern of intergenerational transfers (the working-aged financing the education of the young and the pension of the old) is seriously questioned. On pure efficiency grounds, the case for generous public pensions is rather weak. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
langue originale | Anglais |
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Pages (de - à) | 361-378 |
Nombre de pages | 18 |
journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 134 |
Numéro de publication | 1 |
Les DOIs | |
état | Publié - mai 2007 |
Modification externe | Oui |