Preserving dominance relations through disaggregation: The evil and the saint

Eugenio Peluso, Alain Trannoy

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journalArticleRevue par des pairs

Résumé

This article investigates the circumstances in which stochastic dominance relations at any finite degree at the household level can be assumed to be preserved at the individual level. We find necessary and sufficient conditions on the common sharing function adopted by households to divide the cake among a "strong" and a "weak" individual. The sharing function which maps the household income into the outcome of the weak individual must belong to the class of utility functions which supports the stochastic order. In addition, the household must follow a compensating rule, meaning that the share of resources devoted to the weak individual increases with household income. Applications to fiscal federalism are also proposed. "All inequality is a source of evil - for by the inferior more is lost in the account of happiness than is gained by the superior"J. Bentham,First Principle preparatory to Constitutional Code, 1822.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)633-647
Nombre de pages15
journalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume39
Numéro de publication2-3
Les DOIs
étatPublié - juil. 2012
Modification externeOui

Contient cette citation