Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice

Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Reuben, Jean-Robert Tyran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The ability of groups to implement efficiency‐enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)F163–F195
JournalEconomic Journal
Issue number574
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

Cite this