Inequality and Competitive Effort: The Roles of Asymmetric Resources, Opportunity and Outcomes

Francesco Fallucchi, Abhijit Ramalingam

    Research output: Working paper

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    Abstract

    We study the effects of different sources of inequality in a commonplace economic interaction: competition. We investigate how individuals react to different types of inequality in experimental two-player Tullock contests where contestants expend resources to win a prize. We study three different sources of inequality: resources, abilities and possible outcomes. We find that overall competitive effort is greater in the presence of inequality in abilities than other inequalities. Unlike other forms, inequality in abilities elicits a very aggressive reaction from disadvantaged players relative to their advantaged opponents. The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) suggests that financial incentives are less salient in the presence of a biased contest procedure.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherLISER
    Number of pages60
    Publication statusPublished - 2017

    Publication series

    NameWorking Papers
    PublisherLISER
    No.2017-12

    Keywords

    • Quantal Response Equilibrium
    • contest
    • experiment
    • inequality
    • inequity
    • rent seeking

    LISER Collections

    • Les working papers du Liser

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