Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?

Jonathan De Quidt, Francesco Fallucchi, Felix Kölle, Daniele Nosenzo, Simone Quercia

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)174-182
    Number of pages0
    JournalJournal of the Economic Science Association
    Volume3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017

    Keywords

    • Llss aversion
    • bonus
    • contract framing
    • fine
    • penalty

    Cite this