Decisiveness, peace, and inequality in games of conflict

Juan A. Lacomba, Francisco Lagos, Ernesto Reuben, Frans van Winden

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journalArticleRevue par des pairs


In this paper, we study two games of conflict characterized by unequal access to productive resources and finitely repeated interaction. In the Noisy Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is randomly determined depending on a players’ relative conflict expenditures. In the Decisive Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is simply the player who spends more on conflict. By comparing behavior in the two games, we evaluate the effect that “decisiveness” has on the allocation of productive resources to conflict, the resulting inequality in the players’ final wealth, and the likelihood that players form long-lasting peaceful relations.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)216-229
journalJournal of Economic Psychology
Les DOIs
étatPublié - déc. 2017
Modification externeOui

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