Projects per year
Abstract
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 23-45 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | European Economic Review |
Volume | 113 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2019 |
Keywords
- Influence activities
- Incentive theory
- Theory of the firm
- Organizational economics
Projects
- 1 Finished
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TWAIN: Technology use at Work And Innovative work practices: Assessing the impact on work environment, employees' motivations and effort in Luxembourg
Martin, L., Green, F. & Sutan, A.
1/07/12 → 30/11/15
Project: Research